Abstract
ii Abstract Advances in information and communications technology are combining with the CNN effect to blur the distinction between the strategic, the operational and the tactical level of command. The strategic level of command frequently reaches down through the operational level of command, placing restraints on the operational commander's selection of possible courses of action or limitations on the tactical level of command. The tactical level of command is similarly affected by these same phenomena such that tactical actions may have immediate and strategic ramifications. While there are measures the operational commander may take to mitigate the occurrence of these effects, it ultimately remains up to the operational commander to become adept at integrating the strategic level of command with the tactical level of command and producing the effects required to meet the assigned political objectives.
INTRODUCTION
Clausewitz, the respected military theoretician, reminds us that war is rightly an instrument of policy. Combined with the top-down proclivity to extend the reach of control, the universal accessibility and immediacy of the 1 Truver, Scott C., "Operation Allied Force: The Lessons Learned," Sea Power, Vol 43, No. 6, (Washington, June 2000) , 35 . media can cause the actions of a single soldier to have implications all the way up to the strategic level.
Together, technological changes and media pervasiveness are combining to compress the levels of command such that the boundaries between the operational level of command and the strategic and tactical level of command are increasingly overlapping and blurred. The thesis of this paper is that the operational commander's decision-making prerogative is being increasingly restrained by political mandates and limitations imposed from the strategic level above while also being impacted by the ramifications of events from below the tactical level of war. This paper will draw evidence from unclassified Congressional and Department of Defense military afteraction reports on Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force to support its thesis. Occasionally, to expand on the sometimes one-sided or limited analysis introduced by these official publications, deeper analysis and opposing viewpoints will be proffered from other sources. Finally, conclusions and recommendations drawn from the analysis will be presented so that the operational commander might attempt to moderate some of the effects examined in the analysis.
BACKGROUND
Modern society is undergoing a tremendous technological advance in information availability and dissemination. The news media is also increasingly playing an important role in the process of carrying out national policy. The influence of the news media has become so pervasive, it is now universally recognized as the "CNN effect."
The impact of these changes is no less important for military decision-makers than it is for political, likely to involve high collateral damage -NATO reserved approval for higher political authorities. NATO leaders used this mechanism to ensure that member nations were fully cognizant of particularly sensitive military operations, and, thereby, to help sustain the unity of the alliance.
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The target selection and approval process evolved during the course of the conflict, in effect, to limit the strategic consequences of future tactical errors or mistakes. In fact, after this incident, GEN Clark prohibited further attacks against targets critical to Milosevic or his supporters, power supplies, bridges or roads. Planners were aware that each bomb carried a potential moral and political impact, and that Iraq has a rich cultural and religious heritage dating back several thousand years... Targeting policies, therefore, scrupulously avoided damage to mosques, religious shrines, and archaeological sites, as well as to civilian facilities and the civilian population. To help strike planners, CENTCOM target intelligence analysts, in close coordination with the national intelligence agencies and the State Department, produced a joint no-fire target list. This list was a compilation of historical, archaeological, economic, religious and politically sensitive installations in Iraq and Kuwait that could not be targeted. Additionally, target intelligence analysts were tasked to look in a six-mile area around each master attack list target for schools, hospitals, and mosques to identify targets where extreme care was required in planning. Further, using imagery, tourist maps, and human resource intelligence (HUMINT) reports, these same types of areas were identified for the entire city of Baghdad. When targeting officers calculated the probability of collateral damage as too high, the target was not attacked. On the technological end of the spectrum, the capacity of the command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems established for Operation Allied Force was the greatest yet established for use in wartime.
The command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems provided for Operation Allied Force were unprecedented in terms of capacity and variety of services. For U.S. elements in fixed locations, wideband interconnection was the rule, provided by a combination of military and commercial systems. The available bandwidth was nearly double that used during the Gulf War, an operation with far more forces committed. One reason this was possible is that the communications infrastructure in Europe, both military and civilian, is among the most robust and flexible available to the United States in any theater of operations. Additional C4 capabilities were brought into the theater, even though this impacted other U.S. military commitments worldwide. Ultimately, the operational commander will have to become adept at integrating the strategic level of command with the tactical level of command to produce the effects required to meet the political objectives.
